Vendor: Hewlett-Packard Application: Network Node Manager 7.50 Remote Console under Microsoft Windows XP SP2. Vulnerability: Local Vulnerability Level: High Author: 3APA3A <[email protected]>, SecurityVulns.com Impact: privilege escalation of any unprivileged user to Local System or another user's account. Intro: NNM Remote Console is remote administration tool for Network Node Manager. Unlike the rest of NNM it's installed on administrator's workstation. 7.50 is latest version of NNM Remote Console, because it can not be upgraded to 7.51. Vulnerability Description: The bug is very simple: insecure installation folder permissions. During installation of HP Open View Network Node Manager Console (and may be another OV components, not tested) this commands is performed: C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe /C CALL cacls "C:\Program Files\HP OpenView" /T /C /P Everyone:F < "C:\Program Files\HP OpenView\yes.txt" >> "C:\Program Files\HP OpenView\log\setup.log" This command recursively changes access permissions for C:\Program Files\HP OpenView folder to Everyone:Full Control. It makes it possible for any local user to replace any of HP Open View executable files or ActiveX components with trojaned/backdoored ones and gain permissions of user running any of Open View applications (usually admin user). And worse: there is a service installed into HP Open View folder, namely HP Open View Shared Trace Service installed into C:\Program Files\HP OpenView\bin\ovtrcsvc.exe It's executed with highest possible Local System account. It makes it possible for any local user to overwrite service executable and obtain Local System privileges. Exploit: 1. Rename ovtrcsvc.exe to ovtrcsvc.old 2. Replace ovtrcsvc.exe with any application of your choice and restart system. Workaround: Restore permission inheritance from parent folder for "C:\Program Files\HP OpenView\". Vendor: September, 11 2006 - Vendor ([email protected]) informed September, 11 2006 - Automated response received September, 12 2006 - Human response received (We will investigate this and reply) September, 29 2006 - Second vendor notification September, 29 2006 - Vendor replies patches are scheduled at the end of October and asks for coordinated disclosure November, 16 2006 - Third vendor notification November, 16 2006 - "Sorry for the delay. I have asked the division for a schedule update. I will let you know." February, 02 2007 - non-coordinated public release.